The Emotional Pulse of Foreign Policy: Status Perceptions, Emotions, and Policy Preferences

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Abstract How are public foreign policy attitudes formed, and what accounts for variation in responses to similar threats across countries? Despite the field's growing recognition of psychological mechanisms and status perceptions, an integrated approach to public opinion in foreign policy remains underdeveloped. Building on psychological theory, I argue that perceptions of international status generate collective emotions that structure foreign policy preferences. I employ a mixed-methods design that combines survey experiments with a qualitative case study. Cross-national survey data from the United States, Australia, and Singapore demonstrate that status perceptions elicit systematic patterns of collective emotions that motivate foreign policy attitudes. The case study corroborates this mechanism among elites using process tracing and emotion discourse analysis of semi-structured interviews with key decision-makers. I find that the public systematically organizes the international domain along perceptions of goal capability and compatibility. These perceptions elicit status emotions, defined as group-based admiration, contempt, envy, and pity, that motivate public attitudes toward foreign policy. A preregistered experiment identifies envy as a causal mechanism through which status perceptions influence foreign policy attitudes.

1 Introduction

> "From this day forward, our country will flourish and be respected again all over the world. We will be the envy of every nation, and we will not allow ourselves to be taken advantage of any longer (Donald J. Trump, 2025)."

In his inaugural address, US President Donald Trump appealed to the public by invoking themes of admiration and envy directly linked to prevalent concerns over the nation's international status. This rhetoric highlights a central yet understudied insight in international relations: emotions rooted in perceptions of international status substantially shape foreign policy.

The fundamental interplay between status-related emotions and foreign policy is gaining renewed scholarly attention, driven by its heightened visibility and salience in elite discourse and public opinion. Sentiments regarding the international status of the nation are not merely a manipulative tool wielded by elites, but also an autonomous, generative force that actively shaped the election of Donald Trump (Blum and Parker, 2019; Kupchan, 2020; Mutz, 2018). Furthermore, elites themselves are susceptible to these emotions, as demonstrated in the Trump Administration's "America First" foreign policy (Mead, 2017; Mutz, 2018; O. Turner and Kaarbo, 2021). These emotions manifest as potent, structured responses to collective appraisals of the nation's relative standing, thereby challenging the conventional view of emotions as random, spontaneous reactions. Hereafter, I conceptualize these shared affective responses to their nation's perceived standing as *status emotions*, to underscore their potent function in foreign affairs.

Status emotions are particularly interesting for scholars of International Relations because they illuminate the formation of public attitudes about foreign policy. A persisting puzzle in foreign policy research is to explain how the public expresses strong, systematic preferences despite possessing limited information about foreign affairs (Mueller, 1971; Shapiro and Page, 1992). Scholarship has advanced our understanding by showing that the public frequently relies on elite cues and that individual predispositions explain deviations from those cues (Kertzer, 2023). However, these ac-

counts struggle to explain episodes of uniform mass responses that coevolve with and reciprocally influence elite discourse.

The 2019 trade dispute between South Korea and Japan offers a canonical illustration, representing a rare, visible diplomatic rupture between two advanced democracies marked by intense public engagement. The mobilization of the public may have been initially activated by elite cues, but quickly gained autonomy, feeding back into the policy process as a constraint on decision-making. Moreover, this uproar displayed a remarkable degree of uniformity and persistence, making predispositional explanations insufficient. Throughout the escalation of the confrontation, the technical policy at contention—namely, Japan's export restrictions on polyimides, photoresists, and hydrogen fluoride—was absent from public rationale and, surprisingly, even from elite justifications. Instead, records indicate that the conflict was overwhelmingly framed in terms of nationalistic sentiment and the perceived implications for relative status in the bilateral relationship.

I argue that status emotions are a determinant of foreign policy attitudes with identifiable origins and consequences. Emotions systematically reflect appraisals of the social structure and, in turn, motivate tendencies to act upon them (Fiske et al., 2002; Frijda et al., 1989; Mackie et al., 2000). This paper proposes a framework integrating the emotional and cognitive inputs of foreign policy to identify this pathway. I present results from cross-national survey experiments ($n = 5{,}065$) which reveal the patterns between status perceptions, emotions, and foreign policy preferences. To test the causality of the pathway, I employ a preregistered survey experiment ($n = 962$) that manipulates status perceptions and emotions. I find that status emotions explain foreign policy attitude formation by mediating the causal pathway of perceptions and policy preferences. In addition, I demonstrate that the same mechanism of status emotions in action at the elite level through interviews with actual decision-makers of the 2019 South Korea-Japan trade dispute. Together, these findings suggest that emotional mechanisms have to be seriously considered to fully capture the variation in outcomes of foreign policy.

The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. The first section situates this study within on-

going debates in international relations by tracing how public opinion and emotions have come to be recognized as central drivers of foreign policy. The second section advances a novel theory linking perceptions of international status to specific emotional responses and corresponding foreign policy preferences. In the third section, I present tests of my proposed theory with original survey experiment data. I establish predictable patterns of status emotions from cross-national surveys conducted in the United States, Australia, and Singapore, and provide evidence of the pathway as a causal mechanism through results of a survey experiment focusing on envy. The fourth section provides a qualitative case study of the 2019 South Korea–Japan trade dispute, demonstrating how the proposed mechanisms operate in foreign policy decision-making, drawing on process tracing and interviews with key actors involved in the 2019 South Korea–Japan trade dispute. The conclusion synthesizes the findings and discusses their implications for foreign policy analysis and future research on emotions in international relations.

2 Public Opinion, Emotions, and Foreign Policy

Only a few decades ago, public opinion and emotions were dismissed as irrelevant, if not detrimental, to foreign policy. International politics was exclusive for rational decision-makers who claimed to represent the public, whom they believed could not make informed choices. However, findings demonstrating the rationality of public opinion have led scholars to acknowledge the mutual influence between elites and the public. Concurrent with this shift, renewed scholarly attention is being paid to emotions in politics, the same factor once used to deem the public irrational. As foreign policy decisions increasingly demonstrate engagement with public sentiment, the need for an analytical framework that accounts for these themes is more pressing than ever.

Going Beyond Directional Models

The question of foreign policy attitude formation has long been a motivating question in the research of foreign policy. The public is often described as "rationally ignorant" about politics, par-

ticularly in the realm of foreign affairs, which can feel remote and abstract from daily life (O. R. Holsti, 1992; Rosenau, 1965). Nonetheless, the public expresses strong opinions and sentiments on foreign policy issues (Dropp et al., 2014; Gelpi et al., 2009; Hall and Ross, 2015). These attitudes were revealed to be both systematic and stable over time, challenging conventional assumptions that public opinion on foreign policy is volatile and easily manipulated (Mueller, 1971; Page and Shapiro, 2010). Scholars have approached this puzzle from several perspectives, most prominently through models emphasizing either elites or the public.

Top-down models focused on the elites, explaining that elite cues are the primary drivers shaping mass attitudes. This perspective argued against the claim of a rational public, attributing their opinions to elites' framing of international events and the provision of cognitive shortcuts (Wittkopf, 1990; Zaller, 1992). Consequently, public opinion was seen as largely derivative of partisanship (Berinsky, 2009; Guisinger and Saunders, 2017) or other cues from institutional sources like the media and international organizations (Settle, 2018; Thompson, 2009; Tingley and Tomz, 2020). However, while top-down models provide profound insight into foreign policy attitudes, they struggle to account for findings that the public often develops strong, independent preferences that diverge from those of elites. This suggests that while elite cues are influential, they do not fully explain the origins of foreign policy attitudes.

Bottom-up models address this limitation by focusing on how public opinion emerges from internal psychological predispositions. Drawing on psychological theories, this approach effectively explains the stability and structure of foreign policy attitudes across individuals and over time (Kertzer and Zeitzoff, 2017). A central insight of this literature is that foreign policy attitudes are dispositional—rooted in stable personality traits and values that shape individuals' consistent preferences for how their country should engage the world. Research shows that broad foreign policy orientations toward assertive versus collaborative strategies (K. Holsti, 2004; Wittkopf, 1990), moral and personal values (Kertzer et al., 2014; Rathbun et al., 2016), ideological orientations (Doty et al., 1997; McFarland, 2005; Mutz and Kim, 2017), and personality (Gravelle et al., 2020) enable individuals to form structured foreign policy preferences even in the absence of detailed

information. In democracies in particular, public sentiment is known to constrain policy, as leaders adjust their strategies in response to voter preferences (Tomz et al., 2020).

Image theory, on the other hand, offers a distinct alternative bridging the top-down and bottom-up approaches, emphasizing that both elites and the public share common perceptions of states, which function as key drivers of foreign policy preferences (Boulding, 1959; Cottam, 1977; Herrmann, 2013; K. J. Holsti, 1970). Image theory presents a theory of perceptions, arguing that foreign policy is shaped by individual interpretations of relationships through cognitive and affective processes. Herrmann (1997) argues that these perceptions center around the three key dimensions of relative power, interdependence of goals, and cultural status. Together, these dimensions generate motivated stereotypical images, such as the enemy, ally, degenerate, or colony, that shape both emotional sentiments and behavioral preferences.

Approaching foreign policy attitudes as an individual interpretative process better reflects the reality where elite and public influence is mutual. This is especially relevant given recent findings that the gap between elite and public attitudes and decision-making has been overstated (Kertzer, 2022), highlighting the need for a framework that transcends simple top-down or bottom-up analyses. Such approaches, including image theory, derive their theoretical rigor and generalizability from their grounding in established psychological findings. Furthermore, this foundation provides a clear path for integrating the critical but underexplored role of emotions in foreign policy by linking cognitions, emotions, and behavior.

The Status of Emotions

Acknowledgement of the "rational public" turned attention to the very factor that once marked them as irrational: emotions. This delayed attention is striking, given the pervasive role of emotions in nearly all aspects of social interaction. The historical neglect of emotions can be attributed to two main reasons. First, the rational actor paradigm that dominated twentieth-century social science dismissed emotions as irrational deviations from optimal decision-making, treating them as errors

to be corrected rather than phenomena to be explained (Crawford, 2000; Mercer, 2005). As a result, researchers focused on suppressing or controlling emotions rather than understanding their causal power. Second, in the rare cases where emotions were considered, scholars faced methodological and ontological challenges. Emotions were viewed as fleeting, subjective, and difficult to measure, raising doubts about their validity as empirical variables (Hutchison and Bleiker, 2014). Moreover, because emotions are rooted at the individual level, they were considered insufficient for explaining state-level outcomes, further discouraging their integration into international relations (Hall and Ross, 2015; Mercer, 2014; Sasley, 2011).

Scholarship has successfully overcome these challenges to restore the centrality of passion in politics to the point that scholars characterize this development as the discipline's "emotional turn" (Hafner-Burton et al., 2017; Koschut, 2024). Insights from neuroscience and behavioral science have demonstrated that emotions are integral to human cognition and rationality, while also providing new tools for measuring emotions as empirically analyzable phenomena (Damasio, 1994; Kahneman, 2011). Building on this recognition, scholars have moved beyond acknowledging emotions to exploring their role in diplomacy, conflict resolution, and international security (Gustafsson and Hall, 2021; Markwica, 2018; K. E. Smith, 2021). This growing body of work highlights the pressing need for a cohesive theoretical framework that systematically incorporates emotions into studying international phenomena. Accordingly, the field has shifted its focus from individual, leader-centric accounts toward collective-level approaches that analyze emotions at the state level (Farnham, 1992; McDermott, 2017; Mercer, 2013).

A remaining challenge for research on emotions in IR is to explain how the psychological mechanisms of emotions scale from the individual to the state level. Scholars have advanced multiple accounts of how individual emotions become shared and measurable collectively. Much of this work draws on Social Identity Theory (SIT), which posits that individuals derive part of their self-identity from group membership, making them internalize group interest as an indicator of self-worth (Hogg and Abrams, 1988; Tajfel, 1981; J. C. Turner et al., 1987). This framework helps explain how individuals feel group-based emotions such as pride or envy on behalf of the country

(Mackie et al., 2000; Mercer, 2014; Sasley, 2011). These group-based emotions are theoretically grounded, irreducible to individual experiences, and socially embedded in ways that structure collective political behavior (Fiske et al., 2002; Mackie et al., 2009; R. H. Smith, 2000).

However, the essential role of emotions stems not only from their psychological mechanisms but also from their sociocultural mechanisms. Group-based emotions are not only psychological attributes of individuals but also social phenomena that, much like public opinion, can be meaningfully measured, predicted, and interpreted. Empirical research shows that group-based emotions can be regulated, countering the widespread assumption that emotions are uncontrollable reactions to external stimuli (Goldenberg et al., 2016; Gross et al., 2011; Mackie and Smith, 2018). Individuals desire to share emotions with fellow group members as a means of affirming social identity, which often leads them to conform to what are perceived as typical or ideal group emotions seen as appropriate or desirable (Lu, 2025; Porat et al., 2016; Tamir, 2016). Because these processes are socially patterned and empirically observable, group-based emotions are increasingly recognized as structured, measurable, and causally relevant—making them suitable for systematic analysis in international relations.

In sum, recent research underscores that public opinion and collective emotions are central to understanding foreign policy preferences. However, we lack a theoretical framework that systematically integrates these two concepts in the context of foreign policy. As shown in the preceding discussion, public opinion became foundational to foreign policy analysis because scholars widely agree on its coherence as a measurable state-level variable that is meaningfully distinct from the sum of individual cognitive appraisals. Collective emotions, by contrast, have been undertheorized due to the absence of comparable conceptual clarity. What is missing is a framework that integrates emotions as structured and consequential inputs into explanations of foreign policy. I address this gap in the following section by offering a theory of how status concerns activate group-based emotions and influence foreign policy preferences in both the public and elites.

3 A Theory of Status, Emotions, and Foreign Policy

I advance a theory of status emotions, conceptualizing them as an explanatory mechanism for understanding how the public forms foreign policy attitudes based on perceptions of states. I model this theory as a sequence that begins with the perception of other countries, progresses to the elicitation of status emotions, and culminates in the policy preferences those emotions motivate. This theoretical framework is grounded in the well-documented fundamental link between cognitions, emotions, and behavioral tendencies established by behavioral, neurobiological, and experimental evidence across cultures (Frijda, 1986; Lerner et al., 2015; Piaget and Inhelder, 1969; Scherer, 2001). Extensive research indicates that these synchronized psychological contents are sequential, as the cognitive evaluation of a given circumstance evokes distinct emotional states, which subsequently activate specific behaviors intended to address the potential danger presented by another individual or group (Fiske et al., 2002; Frijda et al., 1989; Lazarus, 1991; Mackie et al., 2000; Roseman, 1984).

Status Perception

A prior question in understanding how individuals form foreign policy attitudes is how they perceive other countries in the international environment. This inquiry into how people make sense of others has long preoccupied social scientists. Across independent lines of research, scholars have consistently identified two fundamental and universal dimensions of social perception, namely perceived *compatibility* and *capability* (Asch, 1946; Fiske et al., 2008; Rosenberg et al., 1968; Wojciszke et al., 1998). These two dimensions correspond to the fundamental task of survival in a social world. To survive, individuals assess threats posed by others by asking two questions: first, does the outgroup intend to harm them, and second, is it capable of pursuing that intention? These two dimensions form the basis of the Stereotype Content Model (SCM) in social psychology, which specifies the process of intergroup perception (Cuddy et al., 2007; Fiske et al., 2002, 2007).

Given that international relations is also a society of countries, it is unsurprising that perceived compatibility and capability are central to its theories. While some early theories assumed that people could apprehend the objective material reality, scholars soon acknowledged that it is the construction of reality that matters (Jervis, 1976; Morgenthau, 1948; Walt, 1987; Waltz, 1979). This attention to perceptions gave rise to theories that sought to specify what those perceptions were, culminating in what is now known as image theory (Boulding, 1959; Cottam, 1977; O. R. Holsti, 1967). The core of image theory parallels SCM in applying these two universal dimensions of social perception to international relations. Scholars of image theory demonstrate that perceptions of another country are determined by perceived goal interdependence (compatibility) and relative power (capability) (2013, 1995, 1997). Herrmann later introduces cultural status as a third dimension, arguing that cultural authority shapes normative expectations in ways that power and intent alone do not (Herrmann et al., 1997). Image theory thus posits that perceptions of other states are determined by three dimensions: relative power, perceived intent, and status.

The integration of status is a crucial modification for applying intergroup perception frameworks to the international domain. In the SCM, status is conceptualized as the determinant of perceived competence (capability), under the assumption that status is earned through merit, ability, or achievement (Fiske et al., 2002, 2008). This framework, however, does not readily translate to international relations, where status is often derived from structural or contingent factors such as geography, access to resources, or historical legacies. International status is understood as a collective belief about a state's ranking within the global structure, based on multiple valued attributes (Dafoe et al., 2014). In this context, a single attribute can shape both perceived capability and compatibility. For instance, possessing substantial offensive weapons might increase a country's perceived capability while simultaneously signaling negative intentions.

I propose a key modification of the role of status in shaping perceptions of other countries, arguing it is endogenous to perceived compatibility and capability. While status indeed plays a distinct role from compatibility and capability, it is also dependent on the assessment of these two dimensions. Neglecting this reality introduces a critical problem of internal coherence in image

theory's 3×3×3 structure. Herrmann explicitly claims that "judgments about the cultural sophistication of other actors affect estimates of their power and the threat or opportunity they pose," which renders the 3×3×3 structure unstable (1997, p.408). I therefore engage with image theory by retaining its focus on perceived intent and relative power but repositioning status as internal to these two dimensions, rather than independent.

Importantly, status within this framework is relative status, as *perceived by the public*. Thus, to expand on this theory, we must first understand whether and how the public understands status. Powers and Renshon (2023) find that the public interprets status to be based on six key attributes: power, military strength, economic influence, advancements in STEM, human rights, and culture. These attributes were the most frequently mentioned keywords in public responses to an open-ended question asking what it means "for a country to be seen as having high status or prestige in the international community" (2023, pp. 742-745). Notably, when the public thinks of status, they invoke not only traditional capability factors such as military power but also dimensions more aligned with compatibility, such as human rights and culture, thereby offering empirical support for the conceptualization of status within my theory. In incorporating this insight into the theory, human rights and culture were integrated as "values", acknowledging that the frequency of these two factors becomes comparable to others only when combined.

Building on these five attributes of power, military, economy, STEM, and value, I introduce a novel approach to measure relative goal capability and compatibility through status perceptions. The measures are introduced in Table 1. I measure *goal capability* as evaluations of a country's advancement through the five status attributes, while I measure *goal compatibility* as the extent to which advancement in these factors is perceived to be harmful or helpful for the country of the perceiver. The five components align with the concept of capability in traditional IR theories, which regard these factors as central to perceptions of relative power. Also, expectations about whether a state will use these attributes for or against us reflect perceived compatibility. As status attributes are closely tied to national interest, how we feel about another country achieving these provides a meaningful measure of goal compatibility. I argue that such operationalization of capability and

	Goal Capability	**Goal Compatibility**
Power	How *powerful* do other Americans think [country] is?	When [country] becomes more *powerful*, do other Americans feel that this is harmful or helpful for the U.S.?
Economy	How *wealthy* do other Americans think that [country] is?	When [country] becomes *wealthier*, do other Americans feel that this is harmful or helpful for the U.S.?
Military	How strong do other Americans think the *military* of [country] is?	When the *military* of [country] becomes stronger, do other Americans feel that this is harmful or helpful for the U.S.?
STEM	How developed do other Americans think the *technology* of [country] is?	When the *technology* of [country] becomes advanced, do other Americans feel that this is harmful or helpful for the U.S.?
Value	How do other Americans view the attractiveness of the *values* that [country] promotes?	When the *values* of [country] become widespread, do other Americans feel that this is harmful or helpful for the U.S.?

Table 1: Measures of Goal Capability and Compatibility

compatibility through status will reliably reflect public perceptions of the international domain. Thus, I expect measures of capability and compatibility to reveal a structure representing status perception.

> *H1:* Combinations of perceived goal capability and compatibility will cluster countries into distinct status groups.

Emotions

Cognitive assessments are coupled with patterned emotional responses. The content of a specific cognitive evaluation dictates the particular emotion that will be experienced, thereby allowing for the prediction of prototypical emotional responses based on a given appraisal (Frijda et al., 1989; Lazarus, 1991; Scherer, 2001). This fundamental connection between appraisal and emotion is foundational to several prominent theoretical frameworks, including Image Theory (Alexander et al., 1999; Herrmann et al., 1997), the SCM (Fiske et al., 1999, 2002), and the Intergroup Emotions Theory (IET; Mackie et al., 2000).

Intergroup Emotions Theory (IET) elucidates how emotions can operate at the group level.

Categorizing individuals into groups and conceptualizing oneself as a member of a group generates a group membership, or a social identity (Tajfel, 1981; J. C. Turner, 1985; J. C. Turner et al., 1987). Once this group membership is activated, individuals can feel emotions on behalf of their group (Mackie et al., 2000, 2009; Tajfel, 1969). For instance, if a country is perceived as friendly but weak, the individual beholder may feel pity. Crucially, IET posits that these group-based, or intergroup emotions, are shared by the group as members converge on the prototypical emotion they perceive their group ought to feel (Mackie and Smith, 2018; Mackie et al., 2000, 2009). This process of emotional convergence can be driven by mechanisms such as emotional contagion, conscious self-adoption, or shared memories (E. R. Smith et al., 2007, p.444). Ultimately, intergroup emotion is understood as a social phenomenon with collective antecedents and collective consequences that can be measured, manipulated, and predicted (Porat et al., 2016; R. H. Smith and Kim, 2007).

The group-based emotions manifested in the international domain are what I term *status emotions*. Drawing from IET, individuals who identify as a member of a nation will experience these emotions as if they were the nation (Mercer, 2014; Sasley, 2024). Because these emotions are direct reactions to the appraisal of other countries, they are inseparable from the status perceptions that constitute that appraisal. Therefore, consistent with the first hypothesis that countries will be categorized by perceived capability and compatibility, I further hypothesize that each resulting cluster will elicit a distinct status emotion, activated by national identity.

While the conceptualization of state-level emotions faces valid critiques regarding national heterogeneity, this does not prohibit the articulation of a systematic theory of status emotions. A common objection is that the national ingroup is too large and internally diverse for self-categorization to cohere at the state level (Dolan, 2018; Koschut, 2024; Sasley, 2011, 2024). However, a theory of status emotions can be formulated on the basis of a prototypical emotion that is conditional upon the mass activation of national identity. Established findings demonstrate that individuals with high attachment to the state will experience emotions as if they were the state (Herrmann, 2017; Mackie et al., 2000; Mercer, 2014; E. R. Smith and Mackie, 2016). Furthermore, the theory's validity

is particularly strong in the context of international security, as scenarios involving an imminent threat to the nation are precisely the conditions under which we should expect a widespread, high level of identification with the state.

H2: Each cluster of countries will systematically elicit differentiated status emotions

The specific emotion elicited is determined by the content of the perception. Because these perceptions are a result of social comparison, the corresponding emotion reflects that assessment (Cuddy et al., 2007; Fiske et al., 2008; R. H. Smith, 2000). First, appraisals made on the compatibility (warmth, intention) dimension determine whether the resulting emotions will be assimilative or contrastive. Assimilative emotions include inspiration, optimism, sympathy, and worry; in contrast, contrastive emotions include shame, resentment, and scorn (Tesser and Collins, 1988; Van de Ven et al., 2009). Second, appraisals of the capability (competence, ability) dimension dictate the directionality of the comparison (either upward or downward). This, in turn, determines the affective outcome: upward comparisons can lead to emotions like envy, admiration, or depression, while downward comparisons can result in contempt, fear, or pity (Fiske et al., 2002; Harris and Fiske, 2006; Taylor and Lobel, 1989).

I predict four primary status emotions to differentiate the clusters of countries. These emotions are selected based on the established findings above and their specific applicability to international relations. Specifically, I hypothesize that the group of countries with high capability and high compatibility (the target of upward assimilative comparison) will elicit admiration. In contrast, the group with low capability and high compatibility (subject to downward assimilative comparisons) will evoke pity. Countries perceived negatively in both domains (downward contrastive) are expected to arouse contempt, which in extreme cases can extend to dehumanization (Fiske et al., 2002; Harris and Fiske, 2006). Finally, less compatible but highly capable countries (upward contrastive) are predicted to elicit envy (R. H. Smith, 2000; Van de Ven et al., 2009).

H2a: Countries perceived as high in both capability and compatibility will be admired.

H2b: Countries with low capability but high compatibility will evoke pity.

H2c: Countries low in both capability and compatibility will be viewed with contempt.

H2d: Countries high in capability but low in compatibility will elicit envy.

Policy Preferences

Conventional IR theories expect that perceptions of capability and compatibility also directly predict policy preferences toward the target country. On the rare occasions when emotions are acknowledged in this framework, they are often treated as epiphenomenal or as distractions. However, recent research increasingly treats emotions as independent predictors of foreign policy outcomes (Ghalehdar, 2024; Gürkan and Terzi, 2024; Novotna, 2024). For example, emotions shape foreign policy decision-making by altering risk perceptions. Fear and anxiety foster more conservative risk assessments, whereas sadness is associated with more optimistic assessments and greater risk tolerance (Druckman and McDermott, 2008; Markwica, 2018; Mercer, 2013). Political psychologists further argue that although emotions toward a country do not automatically produce behavior, they generate action tendencies toward the target that can crystallize into policy support or opposition (Gustafsson and Hall, 2021; Sasley, 2024).

Psychological theory supports this account, showing that emotions are not only responses to appraisals but also motivators of action. Experiencing an emotion places individuals in a state of action readiness aligned with the underlying appraisals (Frijda et al., 1989; Mackie and Smith, 2018; Talaska et al., 2008). Consistent with this view, Fiske and colleagues show that emotions outperform cognitive perceptions in predicting behavioral tendencies, serving as stronger and more direct predictors of intended or likely group-directed actions (Cuddy et al., 2008, 2007). In short, emotions are the mechanism through which cognitive appraisals influence behavioral tendencies.

Behavioral tendencies exhibit a systematic, action-specific structure. Originating in appraisals of capability and compatibility, behavioral tendencies are accordingly categorized along these two dimensions. Relative capability determines response intensity; high perceived capability elicits active responses, whereas low perceived capability favors passive responses (Cuddy et al., 2008,

p.108). Perceived compatibility calibrates threat perceptions and, in turn, the harmful versus facilitative valence of behavior (Cuddy et al., 2008, p.108-9). Together, these principles yield the four behavioral tendencies of active harm, passive harm, active facilitation, and passive facilitation. The two dimensions of capability and compatibility link emotions to behavioral tendencies, with each emotion predicting two behavioral tendencies. Admiration predicts active and passive facilitation, and contempt predicts active and passive harm. Ambivalent emotions predict ambivalent behaviors. Envy predicts passive facilitation with active harm, as exemplified in how Asian Americans are preferred in workplaces but attacked under societal breakdown (Lee and Fiske, 2006). Pity predicts active facilitation with passive harm, as reflected in paternalistic assistance coupled with exclusion or neglect of older or disabled groups (Cuddy et al., 2007).

Because international politics differs in essential respects from the domestic intergroup dynamics on which social psychological theories were tested, I adapt existing models to the foreign policy context. In the international domain, where group-directed behavioral inclinations are realized through policy choices, the motivational force of emotions translates into policy preferences (Hornung and Bandelow, 2025; Webster and Albertson, 2022). I define behavioral valence as the conflictual versus cooperative orientation of policy. Active policies entail higher risk and directed effort, such as militarized action, whereas passive policies are indirect and require less effort, such as collective action through international organizations.

The defining feature of the international system is the absence of a world government. Under anarchy, systemic stability rests on the status quo, which raises the costs of overtly hostile actions. Even when status emotions heighten support for conflictual policies, the public rarely endorses the full realization of harm. Thus, consistent with treating status emotions as contextual variables, the foreign policy preferences they predict signal the motivational potential embedded in each emotion, rather than general or constant policy attitudes. Accordingly, these preferences reflect the direction in which decision-making is likely to escalate when status emotions interact with conditions that render national identity salient, such as military conflict or economic disputes.

H3: Status emotions will predict foreign policy preferences toward the target country, mediating the relationship between stereotypes and policy preferences.

H3a: Admiration will heighten support for cooperative foreign policies.

H3b: Contempt will heighten support for conflictual foreign policies.

H3c: Envy will promote support for low-cost cooperation while increasing the propensity for escalation to militant internationalism.

H3d: Pity will increase support for facilitative foreign policies while also increasing tendencies toward exclusion or neglect of the target country.

I test these hypotheses through original survey experiments measuring perceptions, emotions, and foreign policy preferences toward various countries. The following section outlines the design and implementation of this empirical test.

4 Evidence from Public Opinion: Cross-National Experiments

Methods

In this section, I present results from cross-national survey experiments in the United States, Australia, and Singapore. I designed a multi-stage survey experiment to capture how individuals perceive other countries' status and how these perceptions link to emotional and behavioral responses toward those countries. I first demonstrate that public perceptions are coherently structured along the two dimensions of goal capability and compatibility. I then show that emotions align with these appraisals in theoretically predictable ways. Finally, I test whether emotions account for support for foreign policy preferences, adding insights from a separate US survey experiment to identify causal effects.

The three sample countries are chosen for the following reasons. The extensive body of research on the US public provides a strong foundation for drawing broader implications through experimental research, making it a valuable case for exploring emotional mechanisms. However,

upper-comparative reactions should be rarely observed in the US due to its top-status state. Therefore, Australia and Singapore are selected as middle-power countries with differing geopolitical contexts that can add meaningful variation in how international hierarchies are perceived. The two countries vary substantially in how they are embedded within the global network of alliances and influence. In Australia, 14% of Australians have a favorable view of China, while 40% view the United States favorably (Center, 2024). In contrast, 67% of Singaporeans express favorable views of China, compared to 48% for the US (Center, 2024). Both countries deeply engage in global politics and have significant immigrant populations, meaning broad public exposure to international interactions.

Surveys were administered in English to national samples stratified to census benchmarks for gender, age, household income, and education. Eligibility was restricted to adults who had resided in the country for at least five years. In the United States, data were collected in three waves in October 2023 (n=1,076), May 2024 (n=898), and June 2024 (n=1,010), for a total of n=2,984. Australia (n=1,049) and Singapore (n=1,032) were fielded in July 2024. US recruitment was conducted with Cint. Australia and Singapore were conducted with TGM. All respondents completed the instrument in Qualtrics, which allows full control over the experimental design and data collection process.

The survey contained three modules presented in the following order: perceptions, emotions, and policy preferences. The modules cover a pool of 24 countries per sample, which are randomly presented.[1] First, I measure perceptions of capability and compatibility using five items that mirror status attributes (Table 1). This operationalization follows the theoretical framework, which defines status as a prior for perceived goal capability and compatibility. Before answering each set of questions, participants were primed to think of their own country as an ingroup. Respondents rated two randomly selected countries for each of the ten questions on 5-point Likert scales.

[1]The 24 countries were determined by a preliminary survey in each country. Acknowledging that the public may not have formed assessments toward every country, I filter countries likely to yield reliable results. The countries were finalized as the most often mentioned countries in open-ended questions of tasks to list countries that come to their minds.

Second, I asked the participants about the emotions they experience when thinking about different countries. Emotions are measured with a brief definitional page and a multiple-choice item for a list of emotions, including admiration, contempt, envy, and pity toward a random country. The definition prompt was provided to ensure coherence and reliability in measurement and was adapted from the Merriam-Webster and Oxford dictionaries, with minor edits for clarity and readability. After participants spent at least 20 seconds on the definition page, they were asked: "Which of the following emotions do you feel when you think of [random country]?" A complete list of definitions is provided in Appendix A.

Lastly, respondents received questions on policy preferences toward countries. A natural disaster scenario was used to evoke responses toward the target country while keeping the situation politically neutral. Participants were asked to imagine that a target country was struck by a massive natural disaster. The prompt read: "The [US/Australia/Singapore] government is considering all of the below options to respond to this situation. Click on all of the policies that you would support." The choices for these questions represent the framework of active to passive facilitation or harm established earlier. For active facilitation, I use "Help the country by sending our medical/military personnel." For passive facilitation, I use "Cooperate by providing humanitarian aid through International Organizations." For active and passive harm, I use "Undermine the current regime through aggressive influence to weaken its power", and "Neglect the situation", respectively. I also allow them to click on "Other" and ask them to specify.

An additional preregistered survey experiment was fielded to test the causal mechanisms that underlie the observed associations.[2] A US adult online quota sample was recruited via Cint's Lucid platform, designed to approximate national benchmarks on age, gender, ethnicity, and region (n = 962). Respondents were randomly assigned to a 2×2 design that crossed a status-profile vignette with an autobiographical memory induction of envy. Specifically, half read a vignette portraying the target as capable but incompatible (envy profile), and the remainder read a vignette depicting

[2]The study design, hypotheses, and analysis plan were preregistered on OSF on August 18, 2025, before data collection (OSF ID: J9EXU; DOI: 10.17605/OSF.IO/J9EXU).

low capability and low compatibility (contempt profile).[3] Independently, half completed a short autobiographical memory task designed to elicit envy, and the remainder completed a neutral recall task. After the treatments, participants completed foreign policy batteries measuring preferences for active facilitation, passive facilitation, active harm, and passive harm, and reported their emotional reactions.

By examining respondents' perceptions, emotions, and policy choices jointly, I trace the chain of influence from status perceptions to emotions to foreign policy preferences. Because the preregistered experiment manipulates status perceptions and envy independently, it provides a causal test of whether induced envy mediates the link between status clusters and foreign policy attitudes. I begin by examining how perceived capability and compatibility generate distinct status emotions. Next, I show how those emotions translate into patterned behavioral preferences and evaluate whether status emotions mediate the relationship between status perceptions and foreign policy attitudes. Additional details on sampling procedures and quality checks, measurement validation, clustering diagnostics, full regression tables, and mediation estimates are reported in Appendix 6.

Results

PERCEPTIONS

The perception measures were designed to test whether the public can systematically assess countries' status along goal capability and compatibility dimensions. Figure 1 presents the raw results of status perceptions, mapping countries into the capability–compatibility space according to their mean indices. The three samples reveal broadly similar structures but also notable divergences. While the US and Australia place China clearly in the high-capability/low-compatibility quadrant, Singaporeans position China closer to the midline on compatibility. Russia and Iran also stand out as countries with significant variance in perceived compatibility, deviating from the overall

[3] A contempt profile was used instead of a neutral profile to facilitate expansion to all status emotions in subsequent research.

upward-sloping trend.[4] Likewise, while the United States rates its traditional allies, such as the UK and Canada, as both exceptionally capable and compatible, in Singapore, these allies cluster more tightly with other advanced states, reflecting a less sharply differentiated hierarchy of friends and foes. Across all three samples, countries such as Canada, the United Kingdom, and France are perceived as both capable and compatible, while Afghanistan and Nigeria are judged low in both capability and compatibility.

To assess whether the distribution of country perceptions reflects a systematic structure, I apply a series of cluster analyses. Cluster analysis is a statistical method used to group items based on their similarity across multiple characteristics, helping reveal underlying patterns or structures in the data (Jain et al., 1999; Kaufman and Rousseeuw, 2009). This approach serves two purposes: first, to assess the extent to which the public reliably interpreted the perception items in accordance with the proposed dimensions; and second, to evaluate the degree of consensus in the resulting spatial configuration. The analysis procedure was identical across countries. I expect countries to cluster into four groups, matching the four combinations of low and high goal capability and compatibility.

Prior to clustering, I validate that the survey items warrant the underlying structure assumed in the analysis. I apply Principal Component Analysis (PCA) to the data, which preserves the richness of the 5-point Likert scale responses while capturing the shared variance among items, thereby avoiding oversimplification of the perception data. PCA recovers the expected dimensions with compatibility items loading on the first component and capability items loading on the second, together explaining between 93 and 98 percent of the variance. Elbow, silhouette, and gap statistics (Figures B.8 - B.10) indicate that solutions with three to five clusters capture most of the structure (Rousseeuw, 1987; Thorndike, 1953; Tibshirani et al., 2001). Supported by the results, I proceeded with the clustering analyses focusing on solutions in the 3–5 cluster range.

I apply three widely recognized clustering methods to the standardized factor scores to identify

[4]The Australia country pool did not include Russia, and the Singapore sample pool did not include Iran.



Note: Capability and compatibility are individual-level means, scaled to a 0-1 scale. Higher values indicate greater perceived capability or compatibility. The vertical and horizontal reference lines mark the average values within each sample.

Figure 1: Map of Status Perceptions

groups of countries with similar profiles. First, I conducted K-means clustering on the PCA scores. The K-means algorithm provides candidate partitions for a given cluster number ($K = 3$–5) with centroids that summarize each group (Hartigan and Wong, 1979; Steinley, 2006). By resampling respondents with replacement, I record which countries are frequently assigned to the same cluster. Second, I implement agglomerative hierarchical clustering (Ward's method), which iteratively merges countries based on similarity to build a tree-like dendrogram structure (Everitt et al., 2011; Kaufman and Rousseeuw, 2009). This allows me to identify merge order and nested groupings and check whether the K-means boundaries align with coherent branches. Third, I used DBSCAN (Density-Based Spatial Clustering of Applications with Noise), a density-based algorithm that flags sparse observations as noise (Ester et al., 1996; Schubert et al., 2017). DBSCAN does not require pre-specifying the number of clusters and is particularly useful for detecting irregular groupings and outlier countries.

Final clusters were concluded based on a combination of objective validation and informed theoretical judgment, considering both internal metrics and cross-method consistency (Handl et al., 2005; Hennig, 2015; Jain et al., 1999). Within each national sample, I keep only countries well represented in the two-dimensional map (high cos^2 on PC1–PC2) that frequently appear together across cluster numbers and algorithms. This procedure addresses the limitations inherent in any single clustering method by ensuring that the resulting clusters are not artifacts of a single algorithm but reflect stable and consistent groupings across techniques.

The final map, presented in Figure 2, demonstrates the hypothesized structure, with countries grouped into coherent quadrants in the capability-compatibility space. I treat the United States, China, and Russia as singletons in Australia and Singapore because all three methods agree that they sit far from nearby cases, and their positions are theoretically distinctive for later analyses. Core democracies such as the United Kingdom, Canada, and New Zealand occupy the high–high corner (C1). High-compatibility, lower-capability partners group together in C2 in each sample, consistent with the claim that compatibility is not reducible to capability. Low–low cases form C3, with Afghanistan and Iran doing so in the United States and Australia, and Russia taking that



Note: Cluster labels are harmonized across samples by matching clusters to the same capability–compatibility quadrants (C1, C2, C3, C4). In the Australia and Singapore samples, China, Russia, and the United States are displayed as separate clusters due to their distinct status perceptions that set them apart from other countries.

Figure 2: Final Cluster Solutions

role in Singapore. The high capability and low compatibility cluster (C4) is commonly populated by China and Russia. These regularities provide a compact typology that I carry into the emotion and behavior tests: C1 should be most closely associated with admiration, C2 with pity, C3 with contempt, and C4 with envy.

EMOTIONS

Having established that the public perceives countries along structured dimensions of capability and compatibility, I now turn to the emotional responses those perceptions elicit. I hypothesized that perceptions of goal capability and compatibility will trigger status emotions. Countries perceived as both highly capable and compatible elicit admiration, whereas those seen as highly capable but incompatible incite envy. Countries viewed as neither capable nor compatible tend to provoke contempt, and those seen as compatible but lacking capability evoke pity. To test this, the survey asked respondents to indicate the emotion they experienced when thinking about a random country from the pool. I utilize the cluster membership established in the previous stage to map status emotions to clusters.

The findings demonstrate distinct distributions of emotional patterns depending on the cluster. I estimated a multinomial logit with the four emotions as outcome categories and cluster indicators as predictors, with sample fixed effects. Figure 3 reports estimated marginal means of the predicted probabilities with 95% confidence intervals. The results strongly support my hypothesis and provide preliminary validation for the emotional mapping of clusters. As expected, admiration is most strongly associated with C1 (high capability, high compatibility), and pity dominates C2 (low capability, high compatibility). Contempt is the most salient emotion for C3 (low capability, low compatibility), consistent across all samples. Envy is strongest toward C4 (high capability, low compatibility), such as China and Russia in the US data, and China in the Australian data.

Across samples, the pattern is convergent yet differentiated. China is a focal case: in Australia, envy toward the China cluster is pronounced ($z = 1.330$). In Singapore, where China is viewed as more compatible, envy is lower ($z = 0.620$) and similar to admiration ($z = 0.598$). In the US, envy



Note: Predicted probabilities of each emotion by cluster from a multinomial logit, with 95% confidence intervals.

Figure 3: Predicted emotions by cluster

toward C4, which includes China and Russia, is elevated ($z = 0.903$) and approaches contempt ($z = 1.150$). This pronounced effect is notable considering that envy was predicted to underperform in the US. These contrasts align with the expectation that envy intensifies when capability is high and compatibility is low, while higher perceived compatibility tempers envy and raises admiration. Perceptions of the United States also reveal meaningful variation. Despite being placed in the upper-right quadrant, admiration toward the US differs across samples. This variation appears tied to contrasting assessments of US compatibility, with lower admiration in some cases likely reflecting more ambivalent or polarized views.

I also conduct several robustness tests. First, I re-estimate a multinomial logit using continuous capability, compatibility, and their interaction, and plot predicted probabilities across the observed range. The results, shown in Appendix Figure B.11, reproduce the cluster-based mapping in continuous space. The following section examines how these distinct status emotions motivate support for cooperative or conflictual foreign policy.

Policy Preferences

Having established that perceptions of capability and compatibility shape status emotions, I now examine how these emotions translate into foreign policy preferences. Emotions are not merely reactions but also motivate individuals in evaluating foreign policies. I hypothesize that status emotions mediate the relationship between status perceptions and policy preferences. To test this, I first analyzed patterns in cross-national survey data, demonstrating systematic relationships between status emotions and foreign policy preferences. I then tested the causal mechanisms in a preregistered survey experiment focusing on envy, the emotion that proved most challenging to operationalize and most consequential for attitudes toward China, Russia, and, to a lesser extent, the United States.

Analysis of cross-national survey data documents emotion-specific patterns in foreign policy preferences as presented in Figure 4. As hypothesized, capability governs intensity, and compatibility governs valence. Accordingly, as status emotions arising from aligned perceptions, admiration



Note: Support for foreign policy behaviors by status perceptions (left panel) and status emotions (right panel). Points show odds ratios from logistic mixed-effects models with a respondent random intercept; intervals denote 95% confidence intervals. Estimates are plotted on a log scale. Pity is omitted due to collinearity. Abbreviations: AF active facilitation, PF passive facilitation, AH active harm, PH passive harm.

Figure 4: Foreign policy attitudes predicted by status perceptions and status emotions.

will predict univalent facilitation (AF, PF) and contempt will predict univalent harm (AH, PH). As ambivalent emotions, envy is expected to predict passive facilitation and active harm (PF, AH), whereas pity is expected to predict active facilitation and passive harm (AF, PH). Predictions of foreign policy attitudes from status perceptions and emotions are displayed together in Figure 4. As expected, admiration and contempt closely parallel the effects of capability and compatibility, yielding similar predictive patterns for facilitative and harmful policy preferences, respectively. Envy shows a more ambivalent pattern, discouraging facilitation while giving inconsistent signals for harm. Pity was omitted because collinearity obscures its unique contribution.

To test causality and specify the mechanisms of envy, I now turn to a preregistered survey experiment. The experimental design was validated with manipulation checks, and envy and contempt were measured using self-reported batteries that exhibited model fit and high factor loadings (see Appendix B). Figure 5 displays coefficients from ordinary least squares (OLS) models with treatment indicators as predictors. Exposure to the envy-inducing status profile (CC = 1) significantly increases support for both active harm and passive harm. The same treatment also increases support for passive facilitation, consistent with the predicted motivational pattern. The autobiographical-memory envy induction (AET) also significantly increases support for passive harm, suggesting that envy, even when decoupled from specific status appraisals, motivates harmful, exclusionary preferences. Controlling for envy reduces the vignette's direct effect and removes the autobiographical task's effect on harm, indicating partial mediation.

Table 2 reports the formal mediation estimates from the preregistered specification in which status perception influences envy, which in turn shapes conflictual foreign policy preferences. The Average Causal Mediation Effect (ACME) is positive and statistically significant for all outcomes, indicating that part of the vignette's effect operates through envy. The mediated effect is largest for active harm $(\text{ACME} = 0.188)$ and passive harm $(0.166$, and smaller for passive facilitation (0.065). The Average Direct Effect (ADE) remains sizable and significant in every case, which implies partial rather than full mediation. The proportions mediated show that roughly 30 percent of the total effect on active harm, 19 percent on passive harm, and 17 percent on passive facilitation



Note. Points and horizontal bars are OLS coefficients with 95% confidence intervals. Dependent variables are measured on a 5-point Likert scale.

Figure 5: Foreign policy attitudes predicted by treatments

are transmitted through envy. The total effects align with the baseline OLS estimates, reinforcing that envy is a central pathway from status appraisals to policy preferences, with the strongest channel pointing toward support for actively harmful policies, consistent with *H3c*.[5]

These analyses reveal a clear, causally identified pathway from status perceptions to foreign policy attitudes. The perception of a high-capability, low-compatibility competitor motivates support for passive facilitation even as it boosts preferences for both active and passive harm. The emotion of envy serves as a key mechanism in this process, partially mediating the effect of the cognitive appraisal. These findings underscore that envy is not an epiphenomenal feeling but a potent motivational force that translates status anxiety into specific, and often contradictory, foreign policy demands. These results carry important implications for countries with envied status

[5]To address endogeneity and provide a stringent test of causality, I estimated an instrumental variables (IV) model using the randomly assigned AET as an instrument for envy. The results show that an exogenous increase in envy has a statistically significant causal effect on support for passive harm ($\beta = 1.552$, $p = 0.010$). This finding offers causally identified evidence that envy directly motivates support for harmful policies toward powerful, hostile countries. Full results are reported in Table B.10.

Table 2: Mediation Effects of Envy on Policy Preferences

	Dependent Variable		
	AH	PH	PF
ACME (Indirect Effect via Envy)	0.188*** [0.128, 0.255]	0.166*** [0.103, 0.237]	0.065*** [0.028, 0.108]
ADE (Direct Effect)	0.441*** [0.276, 0.607]	0.695*** [0.507, 0.881]	0.330*** [0.181, 0.480]
Total Effect	0.630*** [0.466, 0.792]	0.861*** [0.677, 1.044]	0.396*** [0.249, 0.542]
Proportion Mediated	0.299*** [0.194, 0.444]	0.193*** [0.124, 0.286]	0.165*** [0.070, 0.313]

Note. ***p $<$ .001. ACME = Average Causal Mediation Effect; ADE = Average Direct Effect. Values in brackets are 95% confidence intervals based on 1,000 simulations.

profiles, notably China, and for the United States when its perceived compatibility declines.

In sum, the empirical results from both the cross-national surveys and the preregistered experiment provide strong, convergent support for the theoretical framework. The observational data first established that the public systematically organizes the international domain along the dimensions of goal capability and compatibility, and that these perceptions give rise to distinct and predictable emotional profiles. The preregistered experiment then moved beyond association to provide causal evidence for the mechanisms underlying envy. It confirmed that status appraisals of high capability and low compatibility trigger ambivalent policy preferences—a mix of passive cooperation and active harm. Crucially, through mediation and instrumental variable analysis, the experiment established that the emotion of envy is a key causal driver of these preferences, particularly the motivation for harmful policies. Having demonstrated the existence and causal power of this status-emotion mechanism in mass public opinion, the analysis now turns to a qualitative case study to investigate whether these same dynamics operate among policymakers during a real-world foreign policy crisis.

In sum, the empirical results provide strong support for the core theoretical framework. The

public meaningfully distinguishes between countries along structured dimensions of capability and compatibility, and these perceptions give rise to distinct emotional profiles. Status emotions systematically map onto specific country clusters and are shaped by the underlying logic of status assessment. Moreover, these emotions meaningfully predict foreign policy preferences, with envy and contempt showing unique motivational signatures consistent with theoretical expectations. These findings affirm that emotions constitute an integral part of how status is processed and acted upon. To explore how these dynamics unfold in practice, I now turn to a case study of the 2019 Japan–South Korea trade dispute, where emotional framings played a central role in elite decision-making.

5 Evidence from Case Study: 2019 South Korea-Japan Trade Dispute

The previous section demonstrated that foreign policy attitudes are deeply embedded in emotional responses to social comparisons of status hierarchies. A common objection to microfoundational theories is that the stakes are low, since elite decision-makers, not the public, make policy decisions. Within the IR rationalist tradition, expertise is treated as a restraint on emotion, enabling experts to perceive national interest to an extent that novices do not (Kennan, 1954; Morgenthau, 1948). Whether emotions are shared by decision-makers is also important for political psychologists, who argue that social emotions only become state emotions when representative authorities carry and express them (Koschut, 2017; Sasley, 2024).

To assess whether the status-emotions mechanism also operates among decision-makers, I turn to examine the 2019 South Korea–Japan trade dispute through a qualitative case study. I employ process tracing to uncover the chain explaining the event through archival documents, official government records, and internal policy memoranda (Bowen, 2009; George and Bennett, 2005). Additionally, to gather insights into the perspectives and decisions of key stakeholders, I conducted 15 semi-structured interviews (Biernacki and Waldorf, 1981; Kvale, 2007). Each interview lasted 45–60 minutes and was conducted between 2024 and 2025 in both South Korea and Japan. Inter-

viewees included senior administrative officials active during 2019, scholars with expertise in the case, and journalists who closely followed the events in both countries.[6] To ensure confidentiality, administrative interviewees are identified only by organizational affiliation.

The 2019 South Korea–Japan trade dispute provides strong theoretical leverage and rich empirical material for the central research question. Empirically, it is among the most visible diplomatic ruptures in recent years between two advanced democracies. Trade policies also feature relatively straightforward cost-benefit structures, which makes deviations easier to detect and attribute. Importantly, the active reconfiguration of relative status between the two countries makes the case theoretically rich. As South Korea's geopolitical and economic standing has risen, lingering hierarchical perceptions from the colonial era increasingly clash with contemporary realities. While South Koreans increasingly perceive Japanese capabilities to be on par, the Japanese public has been slower to update. Japanese political elites have long construed South Korea as strategically incompatible, citing its proximity to China and North Korea and persistent resentment over historical grievances. South Korea, for its part, likewise regards Japan as incompatible and attributes harmful intent, pointing to what many see as inadequate apologies and reparations for colonial era atrocities. Taken together, the theory predicts that both countries will exhibit a mix of envy and contempt.

Emotion Discourse Analysis (EDA) is applied to relevant texts to systematically link political actors' verbal and metaphorical expressions to theoretically expected status emotions (Koschut, 2017). Typically, envious discourse entails derogations of the target, claims of injustice arising from one's disadvantaged position, and denial or minimization of the target's advantages (Fiske, 2010). Malicious envy is associated with schadenfreude-pleasure for the target's setback, as well as a willingness to incur personal costs to reduce the target's advantage, whereas benign envy motivates self-improvement (R. H. Smith and Kim, 2007; Van De Ven, 2017). In the international context, envy often manifests as efforts to undermine the target in multilateral settings and dec-

[6]Throughout this paper, I have translated Korean and Japanese interviews, archival materials, and official documents into English. These translations aim to preserve the original meaning and context as accurately as possible. Unless otherwise noted, all translations are my own.

larations of resolve not to be outmatched. By contrast, contemptuous discourse marks the target as unworthy of attention, asserts superiority, and deploys scorn or ridicule (Melwani and Barsade, 2011). In diplomatic scenes, this appears as public belittlement in collective settings, efforts to downgrade the target's status, or refusal of symbolic gestures such as a handshake (Blanc, 2024). The following analysis traces these emotional registers across the sequence of the case.

Onset of the 2019 South Korea-Japan Trade Dispute

On 1 July 2019, the Japanese government abruptly restricted exports of three chemicals (fluorinated polyimides, photoresists, and hydrogen fluoride) used in South Korea's semiconductor and display production. Japanese officials framed the move as a response to "inadequate management" of sensitive items and potential security risks (Reuters, 2019). Despite Japan's stated rationale, major outlets interpreted it as retaliation, noting that the restrictions followed 2018 South Korean Supreme Court rulings mandating that Japanese firms compensate victims of forced labor from the colonial era (1910–1945)(Rich, 2019). Prime Minister Abe stated, "when a country does not uphold its agreements with another state, it is only natural to impose trade controls" (Abe, 2020), which reinforced the perception of a retaliatory motive. Subsequently, Japan removed South Korea from its "whitelist" of trusted trade partners.

The South Korean government denied mishandling sensitive exports and argued that Japan's expectation that the executive override its courts violated South Korea's constitutional separation of powers. As President Moon Jae-in put it, "the fundamental solution was for the governments of South Korea and Japan to refrain from intervening and allow the matter to remain a civil dispute between the plaintiffs and the defendant corporations" (Moon, 2024). Seoul responded by removing Japan from its own "whitelist," by filing a complaint at the World Trade Organization (WTO), and signaling its intent to terminate the General Security of Military Information Agreement (GSOMIA), the bilateral intelligence-sharing pact.

Unveiling Status Emotions

The 2019 G20 Summit in Osaka took place amid heightened tensions and offered a revealing window into both countries' strategic motivations. Japan signaled diplomatic pressure by limiting contact with President Moon Jae-in to a brief eight-second handshake, an unmistakable gesture of contempt that even Japanese media criticized as petty (Asahi Shimbun, 2019). However, Japan's strategy was undercut by US President Donald Trump. On the summit's final day, Trump issued an impromptu invitation to meet North Korean leader Kim Jong-un at the Demilitarized Zone the following day (Asahi, 2019; J-CAST News, 2019). This unexpected development eclipsed Abe's diplomatic overtures, shifted international attention away from Japan, and raised anxiety over its regional leadership. The very next day, 1 July 2019, Japan announced export restrictions on South Korea.

Multiple strands of evidence point to envy as a primary motive behind Japan's actions. Exclusion from the issue highlighted Japan's marginalization on the regional stage and prompted mocking barbs directed at "poor Abe" (J-CAST News, 2019). Abe had repeatedly told Trump that "Moon is overly optimistic" as a derogatory tactic, a move that yielded little effect (Abe, 2020, p.317). Experts suggest that this diplomatic setback served as the tipping point for an already mounting push for retaliation against South Korea. One interviewee recalled that as early as October 2018, "former ambassador Muto Masatoshi, who had served in Korea, started saying that attacking South Korea's semiconductor industry would bring it down" (Interview 7). The terms "attack" and "bring it down" signal a willingness to incur costs to erode South Korea's advantages, reflecting envy. Evidence of lingering contempt also surfaced. Another interviewee recounted that "Finance Minister Aso Taro even suggested, 'Should we just cut ties completely?'" (Interview 11). In addition, Japanese Defense Minister Itsunori Onodera advocated a policy of "polite neglect," explaining that "Engaging with South Korea on the same playing field and exchanging arguments is pointless; instead, it is more important to appeal to international public opinion" (Joongang, 2019). Such expressions indicate a contemptuous desire for severance.

Japan sought to obscure its true motivations, yet Abe later acknowledged that the Moon administration's handling of the forced labor issue had "ultimately led to the export controls." "[I]t is also true that there were security concerns," he said, while emphasizing that Japan would have "responded differently had there been a relationship of trust." He further explained that he intended to signal South Korea to take the forced labor issue more seriously (Abe, 2020). Abe's remarks candidly reveal how mixed feelings of contempt and envy, arising from perceived defiance by a formerly subordinate state, contributed to the decision to impose export controls.

South Korea's reaction to Japan's actions was likewise suffused with status emotions, particularly a shift from lingering envy to pronounced contempt. In Seoul, the export restrictions were widely perceived as a profound insult. A senior South Korean official stated, "Japan targeted our Achilles' heel in such a cheap, underhanded way that it felt unbearable" (Interview 6). A high-ranking bureaucrat lamented, "How could they behave so outrageously? It's absurd and makes no sense" (Interview 1). These characterizations of Japan's actions as cheap, underhanded, and absurd constitute explicit expressions of contempt. Experts argued that the intense reaction in South Korea cannot be reduced to a problem of lingering inferiority complex from historical memory; "Instead, it stemmed from the experience of being treated unfairly by an equal" (Interview 8). Nevertheless, traces of envy also appear in statements of resolve. Interviewees frequently referred to Japan's intention to reassert its superior position. "A significant part of this response was driven by anger, by the sentiment that 'we cannot lose' ... This was something that had to be fought, even at great cost" (Interview 6).

President Moon Jae-in also conveys both envy and contempt. "There is an unfortunate history between Japan and South Korea that left deep wounds and resentment... Even now, immense pain continues. That is why there must be an unwavering resolve never to be defeated again" (Moon, 2024, p.607). This reflects Moon's acknowledgment of the past hierarchy, along with a benign-envy motivation to surpass Japan. Notably, Moon also expresses contempt when voicing his disappointment with Abe's behavior at the Osaka G20. "[Japan] displayed an incredibly petty attitude. Of course, it was disappointing and unpleasant. At the same time, I couldn't help but think that Japan

was less like a rising nation but rather one in decline" (Moon, 2024, p.590).

To be clear, I do not claim that status emotions fully explain the conflict. However, what distinguishes this episode is that decision-makers themselves acknowledged emotional influence and at times worried that emotional reactions were obstructing strategic judgment. Leaders in both countries accused each other of acting "purely emotionally" (Abe, 2020; Moon, 2024), and high-level officials echoed the charge. Prominent figures behind Abe's foreign policy framework conceded the difficulty of articulating a coherent rationale for excluding South Korea from Japan's vision of regional order, noting that "finding an objective explanation for the exclusion of not just China but also South Korea will be essential" to persuade other states (伸一, 2021). This exclusion is particularly striking since Japanese IR scholarship has long emphasized geostrategic pragmatism, traditionally viewing South Korea as a key actor in East Asian regional dynamics, either as a partner or a threat. That such long-standing geopolitical logic was overridden underscores the explanatory power of status emotions.

South Korean bureaucrats likewise voiced unease. A senior trade official contrasted the dispute with Japan to the 2016 THAAD-related tensions with China, noting that despite political hostilities, trade channels remained open in the earlier case. He maintained that economic ministries should have retained the autonomy to maintain functional relations, yet during the Japan dispute, these ministries were directly at odds, and he warned that "even basic communication became extremely difficult." A diplomatic official contended that the decision to terminate GSOMIA was driven by emotion and conceded that "from a purely threat-based perspective," maintaining the agreement was in South Korea's security interest (Interview 8). Such remarks indicate an internal recognition that emotional undercurrents, especially those tied to national dignity and perceived slights, overrode traditional logics of strategic cooperation.

In sum, qualitative evidence from the Japan and South Korea trade conflict converges with patterns observed in the survey experiments. The experiments show that perceptions of status evoke discrete emotions that, in turn, shape policy attitudes. The South Korea and Japan case exhibits the

same mechanisms. Despite their expertise, Japanese and South Korean elites behaved in ways that closely parallel the public's emotional reactions under status threat. Japan's export restrictions and South Korea's retaliatory measures manifested deep-seated emotions anchored in shifting perceptions of national status. The case is particularly revealing because elites in both countries explicitly acknowledged that prevailing frameworks did not fully account for their own decisions. Instead, they attributed the rupture to emotions rooted in status anxieties. Their admissions indicate that the emotional logic identified in mass opinion applies equally, if not more powerfully, to elite behavior.

6 Conclusion

This paper examines how perceptions of international status influence emotions and, subsequently, the foreign policy decisions of individuals at both the public and elite levels. I argued that the framework of status emotions is critical for understanding foreign policy decision-making, while seeking to make three contributions. First, I introduced a comprehensive framework linking perceptions of international status to specific emotional responses, such as admiration, envy, contempt, and pity, that in turn shape foreign policy preferences. Drawing on social psychology theories, the framework explains how public perceptions of a country's status elicit predictable emotional reactions that guide policy preferences toward other countries.

Second, I provided empirical support for this framework using original cross-national survey experiments conducted in the United States, Australia, and Singapore. The findings demonstrate that emotional responses to foreign countries are not random but patterned, emerging predictably from underlying status perceptions. Admiration, for instance, was most consistently associated with high perceived capability and compatibility, in contrast to contempt, which emerged in response to countries perceived as low in both dimensions. Envy and pity were linked to asymmetric evaluations of capability and compatibility, representing more ambivalent and intricate patterns. These emotions, in turn, shaped specific policy preferences. Admiration and contempt led to clear patterns of facilitation or harm, respectively. Envy generated more nuanced preferences that cog-

nitive measures alone did not capture. Data from a preregistered experiment manipulating status perception and emotion provides causal evidence that envy mediates the effect of asymmetric evaluations on foreign policy attitude formation. Because this experiment targeted envy as the hardest case, future research should extend causal tests to admiration, contempt, and pity.

Third, I validated the proposed mechanism at the elite level through a qualitative analysis of the 2019 South Korea–Japan trade dispute. Drawing on process tracing and elite interviews, I showed that policymakers' responses reflected the same status-driven emotional dynamics identified in the experiments. Japan's export restrictions and South Korea's retaliatory measures were not merely strategic calculations but expressions of deeper emotional reactions rooted in shifting perceptions of national capability and mutual compatibility. Feelings of envy and contempt were detected in the words and actions of decision-makers, showing clear connections to the escalation of aggressive policies.

Together, these findings challenge the view that emotions are irrational distractions from strategic decision-making. Instead, they reveal that emotions set the conditions under which actors define their interests, interpret threats, and justify responses. Rather than undermining rationality, status emotions reshape cost-benefit calculations, revealing how subjective perceptions produce seemingly inconsistent yet deeply patterned foreign policy choices.

This is particularly relevant given the current trend of increased use of economic measures as tools of political signaling amid the rise of populist nationalism. The drastic tariff measures of the US administration are driven by the goal of "making America great again," reflecting concerns about the United States' declining global status. Under existing theories, it is not only difficult to understand the extremity of US policy but even more so to understand why countries similar in capability and compatibility, for example, the UK and Japan, are responding in dramatically different ways. With the tool of status emotions, we can now predict that countries experiencing envy toward the US will demonstrate more aggressive behaviors in response to tariffs compared to countries that feel admiration, even if it appeared like both sets of countries were simply facilitative

in the absence of status emotion-based analysis.

While theories grounded in traditional definitions of rationalism remain essential for explaining strategic behavior under systemic constraints, they often overlook how those constraints are interpreted. My theory of status emotions presents how actors can redefine interpretations of probabilities and preferences in response to those constraints and thereby produce outcomes that appear to deviate from purely rational or interest-maximizing behavior. By theorizing the microfoundations of emotions as a mediator of cognitive assessments and behavioral tendencies, this framework contributes to longstanding debates about misperception, national interest, and the nature of status itself. By showing how different individuals and leaders construct meaning from international hierarchies, the analysis highlights that "objective" international realities are perceived and acted upon through emotion-laden lenses. This insight deepens our understanding of both public opinion and elite decision-making in international relations.

By highlighting the critical influence of emotions on foreign policy preferences, this paper contributes valuable insights to the study of emotions in International Relations and their profound impact on global political dynamics. Moreover, this study represents a rare instance of cross-national data collection including diverse mid-power countries beyond the West. Through surveys in these underexamined contexts, this paper significantly enriches foreign policy literature and broadens the empirical foundation of emotion research in international relations.

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A Survey Questionnaire

Emotions

Definitions of measured emotions were provided as displayed in Figure A.6. The prompt remained on the respondent's screen while they completed the emotion batteries.



Figure A.6: Prompt with Definition of Emotions

Policy Preferences

Respondents were provided with a natural disaster situation for four random countries within the sample pool. Each country was described as being in a different natural disaster situation, depending on the real-world likelihood that the country would confront either an earthquake, flood, drought, or hurricane. Examples of each prompt are provided in Figure A.7

B

Cluster Analysis

Because the perception module uses planned missingness, I validate structure at the stimulus level. For each national sample, I compute target-country means for the ten perception items and esti-



Figure A.7: Natural disaster scenairo

mate PCA on the country-by-item matrix. Capability items load on one component or factor, and compatibility items load on the other. First, the elbow plot examines the total within-cluster sum of squares (WCSS) as k increases and identifies the point where additional clusters yield only small reductions in dispersion. Figure B.8 shows how WCSS drops steeply through K = 3, showing a visible bend between K = 3 and K = 5, across all countries. Reductions from K = 4 to K = 5 are smaller but nontrivial, consistent with diminishing returns after K = 5. This supports selecting within K = 3 to K = 5 to balance fit and parsimony.



Figure B.8: Elbow plot

Second, the silhouette plot summarizes how well each observation fits within its assigned cluster relative to the nearest alternative cluster, and selects k that maximizes the mean silhouette width. Figure B.9 reports each country panel's mean silhouette by K. Mean silhouette improves sharply from K = 2 to K = 3 and is typically highest or near-highest at K = 3 or K = 4, with only slight changes at K = 5. This pattern suggests clear separation for 3 or 4 clusters and acceptable separation for 5 clusters. Where a given K yields very small or noisy clusters, I place less weight on that configuration.



Figure B.9: Silhouette plot

Third, the gap statistic compares within-cluster dispersion to a reference null distribution and chooses k at the largest gap, using the one-standard-error rule. As Figure B.10 reveals, the gap increases rapidly to about K = 3 or 4, then rises more slowly. Using the one–standard error rule, the smallest K near the start of the plateau is preferred, which supports K = 3 or K = 4 as a strong baseline. The continued but modest gains through K = 4 and K = 5 indicate that 5-cluster solutions may capture meaningful substructure without overfitting. Beyond K = 5 the increments are minimal.

Guided by these diagnostics, we tested K = 3, K = 4, and K = 5



Figure B.10: Gap Statistics

Emotions

For each status emotion, I estimated logistic regressions with capability, compatibility, and their interaction. Figure B.11 plots the predicted probability of each emotion across the full range of capability, separately for low, medium, and high compatibility. The US sample is presented in a separate panel because the moderate envy reports distort the overall trend of envy in other samples. Predicted emotions align with the theory: admiration rises with capability at high compatibility; contempt rises as compatibility falls; envy is highest where capability is high and compatibility is low; pity peaks at low capability and high compatibility.

Policy Preferences

B.0.1 Cross-National Survey

Table B.3 summarizes the results of the Chi-square tests and Cramér's V calculations, assessing the strength of the association between emotions and behavioral tendencies across the three country datasets. The Chi-Square (X^2) values indicate statistical significance, while Cramér's V measures the effect size, quantifying the strength of these relationships. In the United States, a Chi-Square value of 62.90 and a Cramér V of 0.176 indicate a moderate relationship. In Australia, the Chi-Square value is higher (105.62), but the Cramér V value is lower (0.117), reflecting a smaller effect size despite statistical significance. In Singapore, a Chi-Square value of 70.01 and a Cramér V of



Note: Predicted emotion probabilities across capability and compatibility, multinomial specification.

Figure B.11: Predicted Probability of Reported Emotions by Capability and Compatibility

0.155 suggest a small to moderate association. These findings highlight that while the associations are statistically significant in all three countries, the strength varies, with the United States demonstrating the strongest effect size.

Country	Chi-Square (X^2)	Cramér's V	Interpretation
US	62.90	0.176	Moderate
Australia	105.62	0.117	Small
Singapore	70.01	0.155	Small-to-Moderate

Table B.3: *Comparison of Chi-Square and Cramér's V Across Countries*

B.0.2 Preregistered Survey on Envy

I measured envy and contempt using three-item scales adapted from previous research. Participants rated their agreement with each item on a five-point Likert scale. A confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) was conducted for each scale to assess its psychometric properties. The results, shown below, indicate a good model fit for both the envy and contempt scales.

CFA model fit is presented in Table B.4. The CFA for the three-item envy scale showed an excellent model fit (CFI = 1.000, TLI = 1.000, RMSEA = 0.000). The standardized factor loadings for the three items were 0.870, 0.938, and 0.625, respectively, indicating a strong convergent validity. The CFA for the three-item contempt scale also demonstrated an excellent model fit (CFI = 1.000, TLI = 1.000, RMSEA = 0.000). The standardized factor loadings for the three items were 0.719, 0.705, and 0.749, respectively, indicating strong convergent validity.

Table B.4: CFA model fit and standardized loadings for envy and contempt scales

Scale	CFI	TLI	RMSEA	Loading 1	Loading 2	Loading 3
Envy	1.000	1.000	0.000	0.870	0.938	0.625
Contempt	1.000	1.000	0.000	0.719	0.705	0.749

Notes: Items treated as ordered. Estimator WLSMV. Higher loadings indicate stronger convergent validity.

To check the effectiveness of my experimental manipulations, I conducted a series of t-tests and regression analyses. As intended, the manipulation of CC had a significant effect on both perceived

capability (β = 1.90, $p < .001$) and compatibility (β = 0.60, $p < .001$). The manipulation of AET did not have a significant effect on either capability or compatibility. These results confirm that manipulation of CC was successful.

Table B.5: Manipulation checks: effects of CC and AET on perceived capability and compatibility

DV	Predictor	β	SE	p	Sig.
Capability	CC	1.90	0.09	$< .001$	***
Capability	AET	-0.03	0.09	.731	n.s.
Compatibility	CC	0.60	0.09	$< .001$	***
Compatibility	AET	0.01	0.09	.948	n.s.

Notes: Estimates from linear models with CC and AET as predictors. Interaction terms were tested and not significant, so omitted for readability. SEs shown are from the conventional OLS output. Significance: *** $p < .001$.

Table B.6, B.7, B.8, and B.9 present OLS estimates for each foreign policy category.

Last, Table B.10 presents regression results using randomized AET as an instrument. I find that envy has a significant causal effect on passive harm (PH) and Active Facilitation (AF). Substantively, this means that autobiographical memory induction increases envy, which in turn heightens support for policies that are passively harmful while also exerting some influence toward active support for cooperative policies. Envy is positively signed for active harm (AH) and passive facilitation (PF), but these effects do not reach conventional levels of significance. Thus, while the strongest and most robust effect of envy appears in the domain of passive harm, there is suggestive evidence of its broader ambivalence—its tendency to pull individuals toward both harmful and facilitative orientations, albeit more weakly.

Table B.6: Estimated support for AH

	Dependent variable:			
	AH			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
envy		0.398***		0.362***
		(0.060)		(0.068)
contempt			0.286***	0.084
			(0.069)	(0.078)
CC	0.630***	0.460***	0.643***	0.480***
	(0.083)	(0.085)	(0.083)	(0.087)
AET	0.092	0.022	0.077	0.024
	(0.083)	(0.082)	(0.083)	(0.082)
Constant	2.581***	2.682***	2.579***	2.672***
	(0.072)	(0.072)	(0.071)	(0.073)
Observations	962	962	962	962
R^2	0.057	0.099	0.074	0.100
Adjusted R^2	0.055	0.096	0.071	0.096
Residual Std. Error	1.293 (df = 959)	1.265 (df = 958)	1.283 (df = 958)	1.265 (df = 957)
Note:				*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table B.7: Estimated support for PH

	Dependent variable:			
	PH			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
envy		0.338***		0.486***
		(0.067)		(0.076)
contempt			−0.077	−0.348***
			(0.078)	(0.087)
CC	0.861***	0.717***	0.857***	0.637***
	(0.093)	(0.096)	(0.093)	(0.098)
AET	0.273***	0.214**	0.277***	0.206**
	(0.093)	(0.093)	(0.093)	(0.092)
Constant	2.640***	2.726***	2.640***	2.765***
	(0.080)	(0.081)	(0.080)	(0.081)
Observations	962	962	962	962
R^2	0.090	0.113	0.091	0.128
Adjusted R^2	0.088	0.110	0.088	0.124
Residual Std. Error	1.442 (df = 959)	1.424 (df = 958)	1.442 (df = 958)	1.413 (df = 957)
Note:				*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table B.8: Estimated support for AF

	Dependent variable:			
	AF			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
envy		0.360***		0.527***
		(0.060)		(0.068)
contempt			−0.099	−0.392***
			(0.070)	(0.078)
CC	0.083	−0.070	0.078	−0.160*
	(0.084)	(0.086)	(0.084)	(0.087)
AET	0.141*	0.078	0.146*	0.069
	(0.084)	(0.083)	(0.084)	(0.082)
Constant	2.347***	2.438***	2.347***	2.483***
	(0.072)	(0.073)	(0.072)	(0.072)
Observations	962	962	962	962
R^2	0.004	0.040	0.006	0.065
Adjusted R^2	0.002	0.037	0.003	0.061
Residual Std. Error	1.298 (df = 959)	1.275 (df = 958)	1.298 (df = 958)	1.259 (df = 957)
Note:				*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table B.9: Estimated support for PF

	Dependent variable:			
	PF			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
envy		0.153***		0.328***
		(0.054)		(0.061)
contempt			−0.228***	−0.411***
			(0.062)	(0.070)
CC	0.396***	0.330***	0.385***	0.236***
	(0.074)	(0.078)	(0.074)	(0.078)
AET	0.091	0.064	0.103	0.055
	(0.074)	(0.075)	(0.074)	(0.073)
Constant	2.944***	2.983***	2.945***	3.030***
	(0.064)	(0.066)	(0.064)	(0.065)
Observations	962	962	962	962
R^2	0.030	0.038	0.044	0.072
Adjusted R^2	0.028	0.035	0.041	0.068
Residual Std. Error	1.154 (df = 959)	1.150 (df = 958)	1.146 (df = 958)	1.130 (df = 957)
Note:				*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table B.10: IV Regression

	Dependent variable:			
	AH	PH	AF	PF
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Envy	0.522	1.552**	0.800*	0.519
	(0.464)	(0.603)	(0.479)	(0.430)
CC	0.407*	0.200	−0.258	0.175
	(0.214)	(0.278)	(0.221)	(0.198)
Constant	2.714***	3.035***	2.550***	3.076***
	(0.096)	(0.126)	(0.100)	(0.090)
Observations	962	962	962	962
R^2	0.095	−0.190	−0.014	−0.008
Adjusted R^2	0.093	−0.192	−0.016	−0.010
Residual Std. Error (df = 959)	1.267	1.649	1.310	1.176
Note:				*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01